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INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS AND REGIONALISM: 
THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTEXTS 
 
 
“The problem -- the most significant problem that consumers of 
international air transportation face today is the fact that still too 
many of our international markets -- and, in particular, too many of 
our largest international aviation markets -- remain distorted by 
government regulation.”  
 
Karan K. Bhatia
1 
 
There is currently a strong trend in the international market towards increased 
liberalization of the air transport sector.  This trend is gaining momentum worldwide; 
Dempsey and Gesell explain: “Although nationalism remains an issue with most 
countries, global market forces, aided by U.S. policy, are moving the industry closer to an 
open skies policy.”
2  In addition to U.S. policy, the European Union’s (EU) wide-
reaching developments in the industry are also a driving force that must be recognized; 
arguably, in recent years, pressure from the EU has taken over from the United States as 
the driving force for change.  Globalization, integration, and regionalization of 
international economies are thus challenging the traditional approach to regulation of this 
vital sector, a sector which is experiencing rapid transformation and reform: 
 
•  At the request of the EU the United States and the EU are currently in the 
midst of negotiations for an expanded “open skies” agreement which promises 
to remove governmental constraints on two of the most important 
international aviation markets.  Also, the negotiations may potentially create a 
new template for international air service agreements. 
 
•  International global alliances continue to grow and expand air service 
networks.  For example, Air Canada, along with Lufthansa and United, is one 
of the founding partners of the Star Alliance.  Recently, LOT Polish Airlines, 
Asiana Airlines and US Airways have become members, and TAP Portuguese 
Airlines will soon join.  The Star Alliance now consists of 15 airlines serving 
                                                           
1 Karan K. Bhatia, Asst. Sect. of Transportation for Aviation and International Affairs.  “U.S. 
International Aviation Policy in 2004 and Beyond.”  Washington, DC: International Aviation Club, 12 May 
2004.   
 
2 Paul S. Dempsey and Lawrence E. Gesell.  Airline Management:  Strategies for the 21
st Century.   
Chandler, AZ:  Coast Aire Publications, 1997, at 411.   2
over 700 destinations in 132 countries worldwide with a 25 percent share of 
global air revenues.
3  
 
•  Increasing consolidation of the airline industry is evidenced by recent mergers 
such as Air France/KLM (2004), JAS (Japan Air System)/Japan Airlines 
(2004), American Airlines/TWA (2001), and most recently Lufthansa and 
Swiss International. This trend cannot be overlooked; Maldutis predicts, for 
example, that the European airline industry alone “will consolidate into four, 
perhaps five, large systems to achieve economies of scale and to successfully 
compete against other global airline combines.”
4 
  
•  In a competitive environment, the air service industry must respond not only 
to the needs of passengers, but also to the interests of shippers, couriers, 
tourism and trade, airports, and communities as well.  These stakeholders are 
calling for further liberalization of air service agreements in order to facilitate 
and promote the efficient operation of market forces. International 
organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) also realize the need for more user-oriented 
policies to allow air service demand to flourish and to take advantage of 
global opportunities.   
 
Due to recent developments in air transport services such as “open skies” 
agreements between governments, commercial alliances between international 
carriers, and increased attention to the promotion of free competition, the world 
appears to be evolving into one global air traffic market.  In many important ways the 
driving force behind this change is the EU.  The impact of the pressure from the EU is 
not only felt by its major partners such as the United States but arguably this pressure 
from the most important regional grouping in the world is having an impact on other 
regional arrangements. This pressure from the EU is also making itself felt in the 
world of international air transport law. Ultimately it will also be felt in the 
multilateral trade law arena. 
 
THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN AIR TRANSPORT 
 
Although the United States has the most well-developed and regulated air service 
industry in the world, it is dependent upon a myriad of bilateral air service agreements 
                                                           
3 Air Canada.  En Route.  February 2005, at 101.  The major competitors of the Star Alliance are 
SkyTeam and Oneworld, which hold a 19 percent and a 14 percent share of global revenues, respectively. 
 
4 Julius Maldutis.   “Industry Investment Requirements.  Looking Beyond 2000.”   6-7 Sept. 1993. 
Quoted in:  Paul S. Dempsey and Lawrence E. Gesell.  Airline Management:  Strategies for the 21
st 
Century.      3
with other governments for international air services.
5  While bilateral relationships 
remain the norm, Dempsey notes however that: “Seldom has the bilateral system been the 
means to meet actual market demands, or to prepare markets for growth.”
6   
 
This system of reciprocal benefit is, however, facing fundamental reform.   
Liberalized multilateral and plurilateral air service agreements are being negotiated in 
Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin American, and the Middle East.  Moreover, current 
negotiations between the United States and the EU to adopt a new open skies agreement 
to govern air transport services across the North Atlantic may have far-reaching effects 
on the future of air transport services. 
The Impact of the European Union   
 
A recent landmark decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on November 5, 2002 
could ultimately initiate an extensive metamorphosis of international air service 
agreements.
7  Over the years the European Commission (EC) has incrementally acquired 
jurisdiction over many aspects of air transportation from its member states, but an 
historical examination of these legal developments deserves attention to realize the far-
reaching impact of the EC’s new legal order on future international air services. 
 
   As early as 1971 the ECJ focused on the balance of competence between the EC 
and the member states in the AETR ruling in which the EC’s capacity to establish 
contractual links with third countries was affirmed.
8  This authority arose not only from 
an express conferral by the EC Treaty, but from any subsequent measures adopted by EC 
institutions as well.  In other words, each time that the EC adopts new rules, member 
states can no longer affect those rules or alter their scope.  More specifically, the ruling 
by the ECJ establishes the principle that where the EC has exercised an explicit internal 
competence, it also has a parallel external competence and that in such circumstances 
member states cannot act independently of the EC in entering into international 
agreements.  In other words, its internal competence is projected externally: 
                                                           
5 The U.S. lists over 100 air service agreements of which approximately 60 are “open skies” 
agreements.   A complete list is available from the U.S. Dept. of Transportation.  <http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/ 
aviation/> (visited 12/12/04).   
 
6 Paul S. Dempsey and Lawrence E. Gesell.  Airline Management:  Strategies for the 21
st Century.   
Chandler, AZ:  Coast Aire Publications, 1997, at 409. 
 
7 Judgments of the European Court of Justice.  5 Nov. 2002.  Whether air traffic agreements 
between Member States and non-member countries are contrary to Community law (EC Treaty, art. 52).  
Nrs. C-466/98 Commission vs. UK, C-467/98 Commission vs. Denmark, C-468/98 Commission vs. 
Sweden, C-469/98 Commission vs. Finland, C-471/98 Commission vs. Belgium, C-472/98 Commission vs. 
Luxembourg, C-475/98 Commission vs. Austria, and C-476/98 Commission vs. Germany.  Annotation at 
<http://www.lawreports.co.uk/ecjnovc0.2.htm> (visited 10/12/04). 
 
8 Case 22/70. “European Agreement on Road Transport” (AETR Judgment). 31 March 1971. ECR 
263. EC Commission v. EC Council. Fifth General Report, point 604.  Decisions by the Court of Justice 
and the Court of First Instance. <http://europa.eu.int/abc/ doc/off/rg/en/2002/pt1070.htm> (visited 
12/14/04).   4
[17] In particular, each time the Community, with a view to 
implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, 
adopts provisions laying down common rules, whatever 
form these may take, the Member States no longer have the 
right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake 
obligations with third countries which affect those rules.
9 
 
  This early ruling has demonstrated that certain powers, which had not been 
conferred exclusively upon the European Community at the outset, may become so 
progressively through the exercise of those powers by the Community. As for implied 
powers, the Court pointed out, however, that the Community's exclusive external 
competence does not flow solely from its power to lay down rules at the internal 
level; the Community has only acquired exclusive competence insofar as matters 
covered were the subject of internal legislation:  
 
[18] As and when such common rules come into being, the 
Community alone is in a position to assume and carry out 
contractual obligations towards third countries affecting the 
whole sphere of application of the Community legal 
system.
10 
 
  Thus, once the Community has exercised any power on the domestic plane or 
through international agreements, the member states lose their power to enter into 
agreements that would affect any common rules or alter their scope.  However, this is 
somewhat mitigated if read together with the court’s more precise statement in the 
WTO accession Opinion 1/94: 
 
[77] However, in the field of transport, the Community’s 
exclusive external competence does not automatically flow 
from its powers to lay down rules at internal level.  As the 
Court pointed out in the AETR judgment (paras. 17, 18), 
the Member States, whether acting individually or 
collectively, only lose their right to assume obligations with 
non-member countries as and when common rules which 
could be affected by those obligations come into being.   
Only in so far as common rules have been established at 
internal level does the external competence of the 
Community become exclusive.  However, not all transport 
matters are already covered by common rules.
11 
                                                           
9 Case 22/70, para. 17.  AETR Judgment (Text). 31 March 1971, available at <http://europa.eu.int/ 
smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=61970J0022> (visited 
14/12/04). 
 
10 Id, para. 18. 
   5
  Therefore, there must be complete internal harmonization in any sector of air 
transport services before the external competence of the Community becomes 
exclusive.  However, the number of sectors where harmonization is complete in air 
transport services is limited to such areas as air fares, slot allocation and airline 
reservation systems, to name a few.
12  It should also be noted that, until the early 
1990s, bilateral air service agreements had never been addressed by the EC. 
  
Air Fares 
 
The European Union has incrementally liberalized its air transport sector in three 
successive stages or “packages”.  In 1987 the “first package” was designed to relax 
the rules with respect to tariff consultations by adopting and implementing block 
exemptions.
13  In June 1990 the “second "package" opened up the EU market further 
by allowing greater flexibility over the setting of fares and capacity-sharing as well as 
extending fifth freedom rights.  This freedom is also sometimes referred to as 'beyond 
rights'.  It is the right of an airline from one country to land in a second country, and 
pick up passengers and continue to a third country.  Dempsey explains that the 
“second package” considerably advanced the EC air transport system towards the 
goal of a more competitive market in the area of air fare approval; however, many 
obstacles remained to free competition, especially for new entrants.
14 
 
The last stage of the liberalization of air transport in the EU was addressed in the 
“third package" of 1992 which introduced the freedom of cabotage, the right for an 
airline of one member state to operate routes within another member State, and 
relaxation of regulations with respect to airfares.  While the “third package” aimed to 
create a level playing field through a gradual approach to liberalization, it is argued 
that the EU was basing its construction on the American model.
15 The “third 
package” included the following three important Regulations: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Opinion 1/94,  para. 77. [ 1994 ] ECR I-5267 
 
12 The Community has competence with respect to other matters such as safety (Reg. 1593/2002), 
ground handling (Dir. 96/97), taxes and duties (Dir. 92/12), noise reduction (Dir. 92/14), denied-boarding 
compensation (Reg. 295/91), air carrier liability (Reg. 2027/97), data protection (Dir. 95/46) and security 
(Reg. 2320/2002). 
 
13 Commission Regulation 2671/88 of 26 July 1988 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices concerning joint planning and coordination of capacity, sharing of revenue and 
consultations on tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports. Official Journal, L. 239, 
(30/08/1988), at 0009.  The package also includes Commission Regulations 2672/88 and 2673/88 on 
computer reservations systems and ground handling services respectively. 
 
14 Paul Stephen Dempsey.  European Aviation Law.  The Hague:  Kluwer Law International, 2004, 
at 55. 
15 Francois Ballestero.  “Liberalization:  Time to Reconsider.”  Transport International.  13 (Oct. 
2004) at 15-16.  Ballestero admits that the EU has “tried to avoid the American-style “big bang.”   6
  
•  Regulation (EEC) 2407/92 –The Community Licence which opened up the EU 
market to all airlines which held a Community air carrier’s license,
16 
 
•  Regulation (EEC) 2408/92 – Freedom of Access to the EU Market which 
opened up all international air routes in the EU to all companies which held a 
Community licence without any restrictions as of 1 January 1993,
17 and  
 
•  Regulation (EEC) 2409/92 - Regulation on Fares and Rates for Air Services 
which stipulated that airlines were no longer required to submit their fares to 
the national authorities for approval.  Freedom with regard to fares and rates 
was an essential part of freedom of access to the Community market with very 
few limitations.
18 
 
  Regulation 2409/92 for the uniform regulation of pricing is broad in scope.  It 
applies to all EC carriers and all routes; however, it is limited to flights originating 
and terminating within the EU, and to those routes not under any public service 
obligation.
19  The Regulation constitutes the first step towards achieving an internal 
Community market with respect to air fares.  Article 3 provides that “rates charged by 
Community air carriers shall be set by free agreement between the parties to the 
contract of carriage.” 
 
Slot Allocation 
 
EC Regulation 95/93 on Common Rules for the Allocation of Slots at Community 
Airports
20 was adopted to ensure that where airport capacity is scarce, the available 
capacity would be used efficiently and distributed in a fair, non-discriminatory and 
                                                           
 
16 Council Regulation 2407/92. Official Journal, L.240 (23-Jul-1992). For a company to obtain 
this licence, most of its capital must be held by member states or nationals of the EU. The latter must also 
exercise effective control over the company. The technical capabilities and financial capacity of the 
companies concerned are sanctioned by means of national certificates.  See Dempsey (2004), at 64-67. 
 
17 Council Regulation 2408/92.  Official Journal, L. 240 (23-Jul-1992). This regulation addressed 
the issue of access to intra-Community routes for Community air carriers, particularly 5
th Freedom rights. 
 
18 Council Regulation 2409/92.  Official Journal, L. 240 (24-Aug-1992).  Generally, a fare 
increase cannot be objected to if there is a high level of competition on the route concerned or if the arrival 
of new competitors is not hampered by legal provisions or practical contingencies, e.g. saturation at an 
airport.  See Dempsey (2004), at 59-62. 
 
19 Id. Dempsey, 2004, at 59. 
 
20 Council Regulation (EEC) 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots 
at community airports, Official Journal, L. 14, 22 January 1993, at 1.   7
transparent manner.
21  In 1995 the Commission mandated a consultant to report on the 
application of the Regulation
22 which led the Commission to propose an amendment to 
the Regulation on 20 June 2001.
23  Although the procedures were clear, and reasonably 
consistent, there has been widespread agreement that they could have been improved.  In 
fact, Regulation 95/93 was amended in April 2004 to introduce clarifications, innovations 
and solutions for application problems.
24  However, the revised regulation “basically 
remains faithful to the previous system adopted in 1993.”
25   The main aspects of the 
amendment address: 
 
•  the legal nature of slots, 
•  slot allocation, 
•  slot mobility, 
•  enhancement of competition between incumbents and new entrants, and  
•  alliances. 
 
  Presently, the allocation of slots in member states is governed by the IATA 
scheduling procedures and EC Regulations 1617/93 and 95/ 93.
26  Slots are allocated to 
airlines without cost, but there is a secondary market in slots at congested airports.   
Commission Regulation 1617/93 provided, subject to certain conditions, for an 
exemption from the prohibition of Article 81(1) on joint planning and coordination of 
schedules, joint operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air 
                                                           
21 Pierre Frühling and Werner Eyskens.  “Current and Future Issues Relating to Slot Management 
and Mobility in the European Union.”  22 Air & Space Law (2004), at 79-81. 
 
22International Air Transport Association.  Minutes of the 106th Schedules Conference for 
Northern Winter 2000, Singapore, June 8-14, 2000. Price Waterhouse Coopers:  “Study of certain aspects 
of Council Regulation 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of slots at community airports.” Final 
Report, 20 May 2000.   
 
23 Proposal of 22 June 2001 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of 
slots at community airports, COM(2001) 335, Official Journal, C. 270 E/131, of 25 September 2001; 
Economic and Social Committee opinion, of 20/21 March 2002, Official Journal, C125, of 27 May 2002, at 
8; European Parliament Report, of 24 May 2002, Doc A5 0186/2002 final. 
24 Regulation (EC) No 793/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 amending 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community Airports.  
Official Journal, L. 138/50 (30 April 2004). 
 
25 Dr. P.P.C. Haanappel.  “Slot Allocation at Community Airports: A Revised Council Regulation 
and a Commission Working Document of the Year 2004.”  Lecture Notes.  McGill University, Institute of 
Air and Space Law.  14 Feb. 2005. 
 
26 Dr. P.P.C. Haanappel.  “Slot Allocation at Community Airports: A Revised Council Regulation 
and a Commission Working Document of the Year 2004.”  Lecture Notes.  McGill University, Institute of 
Air and Space Law.  14 Feb. 2005.  “The IATA Schedules Conferences –also sometimes informally called 
Scheduling Procedures Conferences or Slot Allocation Conferences- are a voluntary activity in which all 
airlines, whether members of IATA or not, can participate.”   8
services, and slot allocation at airports;
27 whereas, Regulation 95/93 was an attempt to 
promote competition by giving new entrants priority allocation of pooled slots.
28   
 
Airline Reservation Systems 
  
The Commission’s first regulations with respect to Computer Reservations Systems 
(CRS) were adopted in 1988.
29   Initially, Commission Regulation 2672//88 required that 
CRS must:  
 
•  neutrally display the flights of all airlines seeking access, 
•  make available their services to all participating airlines, and 
•  may not discriminate in the fees charged or services provided.
30 
 
  One year later, Council Regulation 2299/89 provided for a code of conduct for 
computerized reservation systems.
31 This Regulation was applicable to all systems and 
distribution facilities offered for use in the Community to ensure that they were being 
used in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner.
32 The Regulation also aimed to 
protect the interests of Community consumers with safeguards against misuse by 
reinforcing undistorted competition between air carriers and between computerized 
reservations systems.
33 
                                                           
27 Commission Regulation (EEC) 1617/93 of 25 June 1993 on the application of Article 85 (3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices concerning joint planning and 
coordination of schedules, joint operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air 
services and slot allocation at airports.  Official Journal, L. 155. 
 
28 Council Regulation 95/93 of 22 Jan. 1993. Official Journal, L. 14. This regulation required 
member states to "ensure the appointment of a natural or legal person" to act as airport coordinator, after 
consultations with the air carriers regularly using the airport facilities. Id ., art. 4(1). The coordinator is then 
responsible for the allocation of slots. Id ., art. 4(5). The regulations further provide that the member state 
"shall ensure that the coordinator carries out his duties . . . in an independent manner." 
 
29 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2672/88 of 26 July 1988 on the application of Article 85 (3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements between undertakings relating to computer reservation 
systems for air transport services.  Official Journal, L. 239, (30/08/88), at 0013. 
 
30 Paul Stephen Dempsey.  European Aviation Law.  The Hague:  Kluwer Law International, 2004, 
at 90. 
 
31 Council Regulation (EEC) 2299/89 of 24 July 1989 on a code of conduct for computerized 
reservation systems.  Official Journal, L. 220 (29/07/1999).   
 
32  Id. at  Art. 1:  “This regulation shall apply to any computerized reservation system [..] 
irrespective of the status or nationality of the vendor.”  Art. 3: “A system shall allow any air carrier the 
opportunity to participate, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis.” 
 
33 Id. at Art. 3(a).   9
  In fact, the Regulation applies to any computerized reservation system, insofar as 
it contains air-transport products which are incorporated in its principal display and 
offered for use irrespective of (a) the status or nationality of the system vendor, (b) the 
source of the information used or the location of the relevant central data processing unit, 
and (c) the geographical location of the airports between which air carriage takes place.
34   
 
  In sum, the dominant themes of the CRS regulations include nondiscrimination, 
accuracy, contractual freedom, system separation, and rights of privacy.  Also, in addition 
to EU legislation, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), a private industry 
organization, also plays a direct role in the regulation of CRS.
35 
 
Historic European Court of Justice Ruling – Nov. 5, 2002  
  
The fact that the above regulations with respect to airfares, airport slots and computer 
reservation systems (CRS) are applicable to non-member countries gives the Community 
exclusive competence in these matters.  In fact, on November 5, 2002 the ECJ 
pronounced its judgment in cases brought by the Commission against eight member 
states regarding their bilateral service agreements with the United States.
36 The court 
ruled that member states had made commitments in areas of airfares, airport slots and 
CRS where such competence had previously been transferred to the Community.  
  
  Before the EC judgment in 2002 against the eight member states, the United 
States had entered into “open skies” type bilateral agreements with these States in order 
to facilitate free access to all routes, the granting of unlimited traffic routes, and the 
possibility of code-sharing.  Not only did the EC judgment rule that the eight States had 
infringed the external competence of the Community, but they also infringed the 
provisions of the EC Treaty concerning the right of establishment by permitting the 
United States to refuse traffic rights to air carriers designated by a member state if a 
substantial part of the ownership and effective control of the carrier is not vested in that 
member state.  In other words, the United States could restrict Lufthansa, although 
established in France, from flying from Paris to New York.  Accordingly, this amounts to 
discrimination by excluding air carriers of other member states from the benefit of 
national treatment in the host member state; such discrimination is forbidden by 
Community rules regarding the right of establishment.   
                                                           
34 Id. at Art. 1. 
 
35 Paul Stephen Dempsey.  European Aviation Law.  The Hague:  Kluwer Law International, 2004, 
at 98. 
 
36 Judgments of the European Court of Justice.  5 Nov. 2002.  Nrs. C-466/98 Commission vs. UK, 
C-467/98 Commission vs. Denmark, C-468/98 Commission vs. Sweden, C-469/98 Commission vs. 
Finland, C-471/98 Commission vs. Belgium, C-472/98 Commission vs. Luxembourg, C-475/98 
Commission vs. Austria, and C-476/98 Commission vs. Germany.  Official Journal, C 71/8-15 (13 March 
1999).  10
  Insofar as the Community has adopted rules with respect to airfares, slots and 
CRS, commitments respecting these matters should no longer be made in bilateral air 
service agreements negotiated by member states.  Therefore, on November 5, 2002, 
the ECJ decided that the open skies bilateral agreements recently negotiated by seven 
member states with the United States and the UK Bermuda II agreement all exceeded 
the authority of member states in this respect..  In the case against Belgium, for 
example, the ECJ ruled that: 
 
Pursuant to the judgment in Case 22/70 (‘AETR’), Member 
States can no longer assume obligations towards non-
member countries, whether individually or collectively, if 
those obligations affect the rules of the internal Community 
market and result in discrimination or distort competition.
37 
  
  Although the Court denied the Commission exclusive external competence to 
negotiate bilateral air service agreements, it did hold that four types of provisions in 
the bilaterals were inconsistent with EU law: nationality clauses and “effective 
ownership and control”, pricing, computer reservation systems, and slot allocation 
provisions. More significant and novel still, the court held that the exclusive national 
ownership and control clause, typical of all bilaterals and included in these new open 
skies agreements as a matter of course, violated a fundamental treaty principle of  
freedom of establishment of EU persons and companies, enshrined in Article 43.  
 
  The immediate result of the ECJ’s judgments of November 5, 2002 was the 
obligation on Member States to bring the challenged bilateral agreements into line 
with EU law, although the judgments were silent on how the States could actually 
rectify the inconsistencies. These judgments in principle showed that the open skies 
policies of the EU adopted progressively since 1999 had a treaty basis. The judgments 
also placed member states and the EU itself in a position where they have to 
challenge at least one cornerstone of the roughly 5000 traditional air service bilateral 
agreements currently in force throughout the world, namely the exclusive national 
ownership and control clause. The judgments did not declare that the EU had 
exclusive jurisdiction over air services but they did show that jurisdiction was broadly 
shared and that the Commission could not be ignored by member states. In the same 
way, the judgments did not declare that the Commission should have exclusive 
authority to negotiate with foreign states on behalf of member states, but they did 
make it very difficult, if not virtually impossible, for member states to continue to 
exercise exclusive negotiating authority in the future without violating some 
provision of EU treaty law or legislation. 
  
  In February 2003, the Commission returned to the Council asking for (1) a 
mandate to negotiate with the United States and (2) a mandate to renegotiate the 
ownership and control clauses of bilaterals with all other third countries, referred to as 
                                                           
37 Case C-471/98.  Action brought on 18 December 1998 by the Commission of the European 
Communities against the Kingdom of Belgium.  Official Journal, C 71/17, 13 March 1999.   11
the “horizontal mandate.”
38  Negotiating a new agreement with the United States is a 
complex task, renegotiating literally hundreds of bilaterals is even more daunting and 
consideration was given to authorizing member states to renegotiate these clauses 
bilaterally. In June 2003 the Council granted the Commission a mandate to negotiate 
with the United States,
39 and member states agreed to comply on a voluntary basis 
pending the entry into force of a regulation authorizing member states to renegotiate 
ownership and control clauses in their bilaterals. 
 
  EC Regulation 847/2004 on the negotiation of air service agreements established 
a framework within which member states could continue to negotiate and implement 
air service agreements while, at the same time, ensuring that they would respect EU 
law.
40  The Regulation makes it plain that all existing bilateral agreements between 
member states and third countries that contain provisions contrary to Community law 
needed to be amended or replaced by new agreements that would be wholly 
compatible with Community law.  Important requirements of the Regulation include 
the duty that: 
 
•  Member States shall equally treat all Community air carriers with an 
establishment on their respective territories to which the Treaty applies.
41 
 
•  Member States shall not enter into any new agreement with a third country 
which potentially reduces the number of Community air carriers.
42 
 
•  Member States shall notify the Commission of the outcome of bilateral 
negotiations where (1) agreements incorporate the relevant standard clauses 
and where (2) agreements do not incorporate the standard clauses but does 
not, however, harm the purpose of the Community common transport policy.  
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(The agreements may thus be applied provisionally until the Community has 
ruled on the procedure.)
43 
 
•  Member States shall distribute traffic rights among eligible Community air 
carriers on the basis of non-discrimination and transparency.
44 
 
  However, the Commission found that member states have been lax in taking 
action to remedy the problems found by the Court.  Consequently, in a step to further 
implement the ECJ ruling of November 2002, the European Commission took legal 
action against Member States to force them to amend or terminate their bilateral 
agreements with the U.S. in July 2004: 
45 
 
•  The eight Member States with “illegal” bilateral agreements with the U.S. 
were sent letters of formal notice to comply with the ECJ ruling;   
 
•  Four other Members (France, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands) were sent 
letters asking them to come into line with Community Law; and 
 
•  Five other Members that do not have a bilateral agreement with the U.S. 
(Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) were sent letters asking 
them not to enter into any further negotiations. 
 
Although these letters of formal notice do not officially require the member states 
to denounce their bilaterals with the United States, they do initiate a legal procedure 
by asking the members how they intend to comply, requiring a response within two 
months.  If the Commission is not satisfied with the Members’ plans of action, the 
Commission may bring the matter again before the ECJ in 2005.  
 
Finland, Italy, Germany and Portugal have more recently received a formal letter 
of notice warning them to cancel all bilateral agreements struck since November 
2002.  The letters stated that the members had breached European competition rules 
by negotiating additional bilaterals since the keystone November 2002 ECJ ruling 
which found their nationality clauses illegal.
46  
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  The fact that the EU could possibly issue more severe warnings to members with 
“open skies” or bilateral agreements with the United States cannot be ruled out.  In an 
attempt to speed up talks in the currently stalemated EU-U.S. negotiations for a new 
open aviation area, the EU could require members to denounce their current bilateral 
agreements with the United States.  Such antagonistic tactics would force the 
bilaterals to terminate one year after the date of receipt of such notice, as provided for 
in the deadline clause of most bilaterals.
47  Most of the defendant member states have 
not expressed their views nor responded to the Commission’s request regarding 
denunciation of the ‘open skies’ agreements. However, their attitude will become 
clear if, and when, the Commission eventually initiates external relations with third 
countries in the international air transport sector.
48 On March 16, 2005 the 
Commission called upon eleven member states to denounce their existing bilateral 
agreements with the United States.
49 
 
  IATA reported that, as of July 2004, member states had taken no action to remedy 
the problems identified by the Court, and that it was likely that some meptance of the 
Commission’s requirements.
50  The practical problems are daunting and some 
member states may have been tempted to ignore or avoid the impact of the historic 
ECJ ruling.  For example, France has negotiated a bilateral agreement wherein China 
insisted that France retain the “ownership and control” clause; such action infringes 
EU law.
51  The question therefore remains whether the ECJ ruling will be strictly 
adhered to, or subject to further challenge and delay. 
 
  A towering figure of the past, Henri Wassenbergh, put the dilemma facing 
member states and the international air transport community in the following terms:  
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It [the decision] disregards the principles of public 
international (air) law, the integrity of national sovereignty, 
of existing international agreements and the political views 
of non-EU third countries. Legally, therefore, the judgment 
is completely ‘incorrect’.
52 
 
  This argument, based on the Chicago Convention, does not answer the practical 
problem for all states, including Canada, resulting from the fact that the EU has 
adopted open skies principles for itself and that the ECJ appears to have imposed such 
principles at least on the ownership and control clause of all EU member states 
bilateral agreements. 
 
EU-U.S. Negotiations 
 
In September 1999, the Association of European Airlines (AEA) proposed the 
“Transatlantic Common Aviation Area” (TCAA) with the United States.
53 The TCAA 
proposal followed the 1998 decision of the EC to file a case with the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) in order to obtain a mandate for the EC to renegotiate Member 
States’ bilateral service agreements with the United States and other third countries 
discussed above. The traditional system of air transport bilateral agreements creates a 
number of problems for European carriers. As Paul Dempsey explains: 
 
A particularly negative consequence of the bilateral system 
is that European airlines normally cannot fly to non-
member countries from any point in the EU but only from 
the territory of their home Member State.  This creates an 
asymmetry that clearly disadvantages European airlines in 
comparison with their competitors.
54 
  
  Furthermore, it appears to the EC that U.S. carriers have been the main 
beneficiaries of “open skies” agreements with member states.  Fifth freedom rights 
granted by the bilateral agreements give U.S. carriers access to most destinations 
within Europe. On the other hand, EU carriers’ traffic rights are limited; they can only 
fly to the U.S. from their designated home country; moreover, United States domestic 
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services are prohibited. For the United Kingdom, the Bermuda II agreement is even 
more restrictive than U.S. “open skies” agreements; it restricts access to London 
Heathrow to only four carriers, two from the UK in exchange for two from the U.S. 
  
  The European Commission also considers that nationality clauses restrict 
competition between European airlines, and prevent consolidation through mergers 
and acquisitions within the industry.  National flag carriers run the risk of losing 
traffic rights in the case of an acquisition by an airline of another country since they 
would no longer be majority-owned and controlled by investors of their home 
country.
55  It should be noted that the EU was the first region in the world to remove 
the nationality clauses in its air service agreements.  At that time, however, the U.S. 
was reluctant to change its ownership rules, or address the right of cabotage in order 
to develop an open aviation area on the basis suggested by the EU. 
 
The ultimate result is that current EU bilaterals will be folded into a single EU – 
US bilateral agreement, and to do this, EU-U.S. negotiators will have to resolve three 
urgent issues:  
1.  United States acceptance of EU member state carriers that are owned by EU 
citizens but not necessarily by the citizens of the state which designated the 
carrier,  
 
2.  U.S. acceptance to allow some form of seventh freedom rights by all EU 
carriers.  In other words, a carrier such as Lufthansa could establish itself in 
any EU state and operate services within the U.S. from any city in the EU, and 
 
3.  “Cabotage” rights in which European carriers could carry U.S. domestic 
traffic and U.S. carriers could carry European domestic traffic.
56 
    
In June 2004, the Council of EU transport ministers had rejected the latest version 
of the EU-US draft air transport agreement, and it asked the Commission to continue 
negotiations in order to obtain a more balanced deal.
57  Between October 2003 and June 
2004 there were six negotiation rounds which eventually resulted in a draft agreement.  
However, this agreement has been rejected by the Council of Ministers and further 
negotiations were postponed due to the 2004 U.S presidential elections and the change in 
EU Commissioners.  The negotiations for an “open skies” agreement between the two 
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markets stalled on the key issue of cabotage; the United States refuses to allow EU 
carriers to fly between U.S. cities, claiming that this issue is "non negotiable".
58 
However, it should be noted that progress has been made on issues of security, safety and 
the environment. 
 
In a speech given after the last round of talks, U.S. Secretary of Transportation 
Norman Mineta highlighted major concessions that the United States would be willing to 
make.  First, the United States may be ready to allow airlines based in one European 
country to fly to the United States from any another European country.  Second, the 
United States is willing to ask Congress to bring U.S. policy in line with EU rules and 
regulations by allowing foreigners to own up to 49 percent of U.S. airlines, up from the 
current 25 percent requirement.
59  Therefore, the Commission must consider how it will 
realize the objective of a North-Atlantic “open aviation area” since this will require the 
United States to amend its legislation with respect to: 
 
•  the ‘nationality’ of U.S. air carriers to enable internationalization of U.S. air 
carriers without loss of their U.S. citizenship (U.S. labor may be an obstacle 
here), 
 
•  the possibility of opening up cabotage for access to the U.S. domestic market 
by Community air carriers, 
 
•  ending the U.S. Fly America policy and wet-lease rules, and 
 
•  participation by EU carriers in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program 
which is restricted to U.S. carriers.
60   
 
The U.S. aviation industry, along with its workers represented by the AFL-CIO, is 
concerned with the issue of “nationality” wherein EU airlines holding a license in one 
member state could be “designated” as a European carrier in another country.
61  The 
lobby fears such an agreement would create a “flag of convenience” carrier, whereby a 
carrier could choose to receive its licence from a particular member state with low labor 
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and regulatory costs, yet operate services out of, and enjoy the benefits of, operating as an 
airline from another member state.  The AFL-CIO explains: 
 
While some harmonization of EU laws have occurred, we 
would note that dramatic differences remain between 
various EU nations regarding, for example, the selection of 
collective bargaining representatives, the formation of 
collective bargaining agreements, and the enforcement of 
those agreements. The type of forum shopping that these 
differences encourage could result in a “race to the bottom” 
in labor standards as foreign carriers seek out countries 
with the labor laws most beneficial to their financial 
interests. Not only would this jeopardize the rights of EU 
carrier employees, but it would place U.S. workers and 
carriers at an unfair competitive disadvantage.  
  
  A major opponent to allowing cabotage rights is the U.S. Coalition of Airline 
Pilots Association (CAPA) which actively lobbies the U.S. Congress on the issue.
62 The 
AFL-CIO, another strong U.S. lobby, opposes changes to U.S. “wet lease” rules that the 
EC wishes to abolish in order to circumvent the U.S. workforce and their collective 
bargaining agreement protections.  Wet-leasing requires U.S. carriers to use U.S. crews 
when leasing foreign aircraft.
63  The EC also seeks changes to the “Fly America Act” 
which stipulates that only U.S. airlines may provide transportation paid for by the U.S. 
government.  The U.S Dept. of Transportation claims that national defense considerations 
play a central role in the evaluation of EC proposals with respect to the “Fly America 
Act” which is tied to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program.
64  Airlines that 
participate CRAF voluntarily commit to provide aircraft, crews, fuel, maintenance, and 
ground-support equipment in support of U.S. military operations in times of national 
emergency or conflict.  In return, participating carriers are eligible to receive peacetime 
government business, a market totaling $2 billion annually. This program has been 
restricted to U.S. carriers.
65  
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Since the rejection of the Draft Agreement by the Council of Ministers in June 
2004, there have been several technical meetings, but it is too early to ascertain any 
tangible consensus on the context of new or revised bilateral air service agreements.
66  
EU-U.S. negotiations will thus need to tackle many serious issues including competition 
rules and policy.  Considering the previous discussion of the Commission’s step-by-step, 
orchestrated attempt to regulate the EU air transport sector, it is probable that any future 
“open skies” agreement with the United States (and other third states) will be concluded 
by both the EU and its member states, a process referred to as “mixity.”  Although the 
EU-U.S. negotiations appear to be stalemated at this time, the impetus of the 
Commission’s efforts will be far-reaching, and it is anticipated that the outcome will most 
likely have a significant effect on the global aviation industry.   
 
The fact remains that the exact scope of the forthcoming EU-U.S. air service 
agreement is difficult to predict.  Furthermore, the enlargement of the EU aviation area 
with neighboring countries may become a complicating factor in the negotiations.   
Soames, Goeteyn and Camesasca (2004) have drafted several possible scenarios.
67  The 
least desirable from the EU perspective would be an “open skies-type” arrangement, 
granting EU-controlled and U.S. controlled carriers the right to offer air transport services 
between the two areas but leaving current limitations on the provision of domestic U.S. 
services and foreign investment untouched. This would allow consolidation to take place 
between EU carriers, but would not permit EU-U.S. mergers or acquisitions of control.  
At the other end of the spectrum, a more liberal EU-U.S. agreement could create a single 
open aviation market encompassing the provision of both domestic and international air 
transport services, as well as the abolition of restrictions on investments by EU and U.S. 
investors in each other’s airlines.  This would eliminate the regulatory barriers that 
currently impede consolidation between EU and U.S. carriers, and it would enable 
significant re-structuring to take place within the aviation industry.
68   
 
Many concede that a potential agreement between the EU and the United States 
may become the international template for air service agreements.  From an American 
perspective, what is at stake is a potentially interesting attempt to negotiate a common 
aviation area between the EU and the United States.  For the European Commission, it 
means much more.  External negotiations with the United States not only provide the 
basis for more flexible business operations in transatlantic aviation, but they also imply 
                                                                                                                                                                             
foreign airline; and (3) any changes to the regulations to allow foreign ownership and control of U.S. 
carriers would lead to problems in the CRAF program.” 
 
66 For example, on 18 February 2003, the Commission and the U.S. administration issued a joint 
statement outlining the first undertakings that U.S. Customs had given regarding data protection, and 
seeking to bring the way the U.S. use and protect PNR data closer to EU standards. 
<http://wwwdb.europarl.eu.int/oeil/oeil_viewdnl.ProcedureView?lang=2&procid=2958> (visited on 
25/02/05). 
 
67 Trevor Soames, Geert Goeteyn and Peter D. Camesasca. "European Aviation Law:  New Wings 
Unfolding," 29 Air & Space Law (May 2004) at 115.   
 
68 Id. at 118.  19
the completion of the internal European aviation market and, more important, increased 
policy competence in air transport services for the Commission itself.
69 
 
Current EU Negotiations with Third Countries 
 
As noted above, on February 2003, the Commission asked the Council to grant it a 
mandate to negotiate air service agreements with all third countries.
70  This so-called 
"horizontal mandate" provides for the revision of clauses relating to the ownership and 
control of airline companies and all other matters coming under the exclusive external 
competence of the Community.
71  In June 2003, the Council granted the Commission the 
abovementioned mandate, and member states undertook to comply with the agreement on 
a voluntary basis pending the entry into force of what became Regulation (EC) 
847/2004.
72   
 
The new Regulation, (EC) 847/2004, aims to put an end to the uncertainty that 
prevailed in the air transport sector following the historic ECJ judgment of November 
2002 which declared that the bilateral agreements between the United States and eight 
member states were incompatible with EU law.
73  The Regulation provides: 
 
•  Member States may enter into negotiations with a third country concerning 
new air service agreements or the modification of an existing air service 
agreement, its annexes or any other related bilateral or multilateral 
arrangement provided that any relevant standard clauses, developed and laid 
down jointly between Member States and the Commission, are included in 
such negotiations.
74 
 
•  In so far as air carriers and other interested parties are to be involved in the 
negotiations, Member States shall equally treat all Community air carriers 
which have an establishment on their respective territories.
75 
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•  A Member State shall not enter into any new arrangement with a third country 
which reduces the number of Community air carriers which may, in 
accordance with existing arrangements, be designated to provide services 
between its territory and that country, neither in respect of the entire air 
transport market between the two parties nor on the basis of specific city 
pairs.
76 
  
In sum, the Regulation lays down a set of principles providing for an adequate 
exchange of information within the EU to ensure that member states do not risk 
infringing EU law in their bilateral relations with third countries in the air service sector.  
As discussed earlier, the ECJ has confirmed the exclusive competence of the EU to 
negotiate, sign and conclude such agreements when they deal with matters within its own 
area of competence.  It has also confirmed the right of EU air carriers to benefit from the 
right of establishment within the EU, including their right to non-discriminatory market 
access to routes between all member states and third countries. 
 
The new Regulation also establishes a procedure for notifying and authorizing the 
bilateral negotiations conducted by member states to ensure the introduction of the 
standard clauses of the “horizontal mandate”, thus bringing existing agreements into 
compliance with EU law. With regard to the horizontal clauses for the EU bilateral air 
service agreement, five third countries have thus far adopted the Community “designation 
clause:  Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Georgia and Lebanon.
77   Provisions of the clause 
include: 
  
•  On receipt of a designation by a Member State, [name of the third country] 
shall grant the appropriate authorizations and permissions with minimum 
procedural delay, provided that: (1) the air carrier is established in the territory 
of the designating Member State under the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and has a valid Operating Licence in accordance with European 
Community law; (2) effective regulatory control of the air carrier is exercised 
and maintained by the Member State responsible for issuing its Air Operators 
Certificate and the relevant aeronautical authority is clearly identified in the 
designation; and (3) the air carrier is owned and shall continue to be owned 
directly or through majority ownership by Member States and/or nationals of 
Member States, and/or by other states listed in Annex 3 and/or nationals of 
such other states, and shall at all times be effectively controlled by such states 
and/or such nationals. 
 
•  [Name of the third country] may refuse, revoke, suspend or limit the 
authorisations or permissions of an air carrier designated by a Member State 
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where: (1) the air carrier is not established in the territory of the designating 
Member State under the Treaty establishing the European Community or does 
not have a valid Operating Licence in accordance with European Community 
law; (2) effective regulatory control of the air carrier is not exercised or not 
maintained by the Member State responsible for issuing its Air Operators 
Certificate, or the relevant aeronautical authority is not clearly identified in the 
designation; or (3) the air carrier is not owned, directly or through majority 
ownership, or it is not effectively controlled by Member States and/or 
nationals of Member States, and/or by other states listed in Annex 3 and/or 
nationals of such other states. 
 
•  In exercising its right under this paragraph, [name of the third country] shall 
not discriminate between Community air carriers on the grounds of 
nationality. 
 
To reassure third countries that these standards will be maintained, member states 
have made a unanimous declaration that they will respond fully and expeditiously to any 
concerns raised by third countries.
78  Regulation (EC) 847/2004 also imposes certain 
obligations on member states to ensure that non-discriminatory procedures are 
established for the consultation of stakeholders and for the distribution of traffic rights 
during negotiations.
79 
 
Under international law, the sections of the existing bilateral agreements which 
have been held to be contrary to Community law are not automatically invalid.  However, 
the member states must accept the consequences of these judgments; for example, they 
can no longer negotiate on matters which are within the Community's exclusive external 
competence, and must in any event rectify any incompatibilities arising out of the 
agreements even if this makes it necessary to denounce the agreements.  It is interesting 
to note en passant that the EC regulations do not apply to the airport of Gibraltar due to 
the respective legal positions of the Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom with 
regard to the dispute over sovereignty of the territory in which the airport is situated.
80  
 
Also, France has recently signed a bilateral air transport agreement with the 
People’s Republic of China that retained the “illegal” substantial ownership and effective 
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control clause. General consensus at ICAO suggests that EU member states may thus 
continue to conduct “business as usual” awaiting the conclusion of EU-U.S. negotiations 
which may produce a template for future air service agreements; more importantly, such 
an agreement may confirm the Community’s external competence with respect to 
bilateral air service agreements. 
 
Consolidation and Cooperation 
 
The Commission’s proposals for increased control of third country agreements have been 
aimed at providing a coherent European policy for international air transport and, in 
particular, removing the uncertainty resulting from the ECJ’s November 2002 ruling on 
members’ bilateral agreements.  The task of renegotiating many hundreds of bilateral 
agreements between member states and third countries would be immense.
81  Therefore, 
for practical reasons, member states will most likely continue to negotiate with third 
countries on an individual basis in the short-term, and will continue to manage their 
existing arrangements.  Only time will tell whether member states’ negotiations will be 
conducted in accordance with the EC regulations on the basis of standard clauses of the 
“horizontal mandate” agreed upon at the Community level.  At the time of this writing, 
only (six) third countries have initialed the Community clause and are waiting on 
ratification.
82  It should be noted that, although the clause establishes the right of 
establishment and non-discriminatory access to air routes between Member States and 
third countries, capacity and frequencies are not affected. 
 
The impact of current regulations is enhanced, however, by the EU’s position in 
terms of its ability to advise, assist and build relations with third countries and other 
regional organizations.  EU Transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio explains: 
 
Through the European Union's various trade and 
cooperation agreements, there is already scope to exchange 
information with other regional groups about the 
development and regulation of air transport. Using 
experience gained in the liberalization process and its 
extensive trade relationships with other regional groupings 
(notably in Asia, Africa and Latin America), the 
Commission is considering initiating a more active and 
substantial dialogue with some of these regions.   This 
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process could also lead to the simplification and 
regionalization of certain aviation agreements that are 
currently of a bilateral nature.
83 
 
  The fact that the EU is stepping up aviation relations with its neighbors cannot be 
overlooked; most of the countries neighboring the enlarged Community are important 
trading partners.  Ten countries from central, eastern and southern Europe have already 
joined the EU, thus building towards a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) of 25 
states along with three associated states: Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.
84 
Consequently, the Commission has proposed a framework for negotiations with a view to 
stepping up aviation relations with all countries neighboring the enlarged EU, further to 
the south as well as to the east.
85  The aim of this framework is to organize a coherent and 
flexible method of liberalizing aviation relations within a wider Europe.  Flexibility is 
essential in order to accommodate the differing political, legal and administrative aviation 
environment of all the neighboring countries concerned.      
 
The EU has been seeking new agreements with the Western Balkan States “based 
on acceptance of Community legislation in air transport.”
86 Furthermore, the ECAA 
provides a basis for developing closer ties with other close trading partners around the 
Mediterranean and to the East.
87  Focusing on Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan, the Euro-
Mediterranean Aviation agreements will be based on the traditional approach to open 
aviation areas which will cover a wide range of issues aimed at the reciprocal opening of 
markets and the removal of economic barriers to trade and investment; such agreements 
would include a “most favorite nation” clause.
88  The EU also has plans to negotiate a 
comprehensive agreement with Turkey “bringing all its agreements with Member States 
into line with Community law.”
89 
 
The EU is also directing even more attention to its main partners to the east.  
Among these, the Russian Federation plays an essential role in the field of aviation. It 
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will be necessary to strengthen cooperation between the Community as a whole and 
Russia, addressing all issues of common interest such as industrial cooperation, safety 
and certification, environment, airports and air traffic management.  In the context of this 
broad dialogue, the Commission also aims to ensure that transit through Russia is 
normalized.
90   
 
Further to the east, Japan is another essential aviation partner. The Commission 
will continue to push for fair access to Tokyo's airports, as current barriers are making it 
difficult to develop links with Japan.  As in the case of Russia, the objective will be to go 
beyond specific issues and to build a long-term partnership for cooperation, including 
international policy coordination.
91 
 
In many developing countries, where land infrastructure is often insufficient and 
distances are great, air transport services are essential.  For exporters, it provides the only 
fast and reliable route to the markets of Europe, while for the tourism industry, it often 
provides the only means of reaching many destinations.  The Commission is therefore 
determined to provide assistance to a large number of developing countries, particularly 
with a view to giving these countries the means to apply safety standards which are 
constantly improving worldwide.
92  The EU plans to work with developing countries to 
ensure that air transport is free to develop between Europe and these countries in a 
positive manner, expanding opportunities for both sides without compromising on 
standards.
93 
 
The European Commission has negotiated an aviation agreement with Chile to 
liberalize the routes that European airlines can use to Latin American.  The agreement, 
which has been submitted to EU governments for their approval, would enable EU 
airlines to fly to Chile from any of the EU member states and not just from their own 
territory.  In return it would also allow non-Chilean airlines to fly from Chile to the EU.
94 
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In sum, the EU’s efforts in air services liberalization are far-reaching.  According 
to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the EU represents an important 
group of “like-minded” states whose efforts must be viewed as a major catalyst for 
change.
95  EU aviation rules now apply to 28 countries and will gradually also apply to 
other adjacent and third countries to some degree as previously discussed.
96 As a 
prerequisite to membership, these third countries must commit themselves to apply EU 
regulations governing commercial and safety issues, although transitional periods will be 
negotiated with individual countries.  As of March 2005 the EU was negotiating a 
comprehensive air transport agreement with Morocco.
97   
 
The impact of the renegotiation of ownership and control clauses by member 
states in some 1,500 to 2,000 air service agreements with partners around the world will 
certainly prove to be a complicated process, and IATA proposes that this difficulty might 
best be overcome by unilateral declaration, or plurilateral (bloc-to-bloc) agreements.
98 
The impact of this renegotiation on the spread of open skies principles and the breaking 
down of the old restrictive bilateral order is difficult to calculate at the present time but it 
would be unwise for any country, especially Canada, simply to ignore this potentially 
dynamic development.   
 
 
EU Membership in International Organizations  
 
The EU is a unique construct.  The limited and specific conferral of powers under the EC 
Treaty defines the responsibilities between the Community and the member states.  More 
specifically, the Community only has those powers which have been conferred upon it.  
However, from the previous discussion of the “open skies” cases brought by the EC 
against eight member states, this “power” perspective may be oversimplified.  The ECJ 
ruling in 1998 against the Member States has demonstrated that it is not so much that 
Member States do not have “power” to conclude bilateral air service agreements, but 
rather they have failed to take into consideration certain rules formulated by the EC such 
as those concerning carrier nationality, air fares, CRS, and airport slots. 
 
This brings up the legal justification of mixity.  With respect to air service 
agreements, the Community has not been able to conclude such an agreement alone, 
because its competence does not cover the entire agreement.  This dilemma is also 
reflected in Community participation in international organizations.  For example, in the 
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early 1970s the Community participated, together with the member states, in the 
negotiations leading to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.  However, there were 
difficulties in reaching common positions; in fact, the only issue on which the group was 
united was that advocating the right of the Community to become a party to the 
Convention.  The problem was solved by allowing Community signature, but there were 
“stringent” conditions laid down in Annex IX of the Convention.
99  For example, the 
annex enabled the Community to join the Convention, but only if a majority of the 
member states joined as well.  Consequently, the Convention became a model for mixity 
when negotiating other multilateral treaties which commonly required a declaration of 
competences.  For example, it was commonly necessary to indicate whether the rights 
and obligations created were binding on the Community, on its Member States, or both.     
  
In the complex “mixed” negotiations of the GATT Uruguay Round which led to 
the establishment of the WTO, the preponderant role of the Community was generally 
accepted until the end of the negotiations.  Opinion 1/94 finally decided that GATS 
comes within the joint competence of the Community and member states which enables 
each member state to insist upon agreeing with the detail of any GATS negotiation.
100 
  
In contrast to its membership in the WTO, the Community is also a member of the 
U.N Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) alongside all of the member states; 
however, participation is governed by the principle of “alternative exercise of 
membership rights.”
101  In other words, the Community or its member states are required 
to indicate which of them has competence with respect to any specific issue or question 
during any negotiations.  If the Community has competence, it will cast a number of 
votes equal to the number of member states. 
 
This brief discussion of EU membership in international organizations 
demonstrates that the relationship between Community and Member State competence is 
complex in external relations.  Yet, as the Community becomes increasingly competent 
as an actor in the international air transport sector, the question of state sovereignty must 
be addressed.  The principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of a state over its 
territorial airspace was been confirmed by the Chicago Convention in 1944, and it has 
since been the legal standard in international civil aviation.
102  The question therefore 
arises:  “What will be the Community’s role in international aviation organizations 
which, due to security and other national issues, are particularly state-centered?” 
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The Impact of the EU on ICAO 
 
The importance of a unified European front for future air services liberalisation is 
evidenced not only by the EU’s orchestrated series of aviation regulations, but also its 
increased participation in the international aviation forum.  The International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) is an agency of the United Nations whose strategic 
objectives are to: 
 
•  enhance global civil aviation safety and security, 
•  minimize the adverse effect of global civil aviation on the environment, 
•  enhance the efficiency of aviation operations, 
•  maintain the continuity of aviation operations, and 
•  strengthen law governing international civil aviation.
103 
 
Although the EU is not a sovereign state and has no formal status in the ICAO, 
the member states have been jointly represented in some circumstances.
104  For example, 
the EC defended its decision to ban “hush-kitted” aircraft from the EU, following 
complaints from the United States to ICAO that the measures discriminated against U.S. 
airlines.  The ICAO ruled against the Community measures.
105 Also, in 2002 the 
Commission requested the ICAO Council to formally start negotiations on Community 
membership in ICAO with a view of ensuring a single representation of the EU.
106  It 
should be noted that in the area of air carrier liability, given the existence of a common 
EU regime, the Commission was able to negotiate and sign the 1999 Montreal 
Convention, which modernized the worldwide system of airline liability.
107  Article 53 of 
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the Montreal Convention guaranteed that the Convention was open for signature by 
Regional Economic Integration Organizations such as the EU: 
 
 
For the Purpose of this Convention, a “Regional Economic 
Integration Organization” means any organization which is 
constituted by sovereign States of a given region which has 
competence in respect of certain matters governed by this 
Convention and has been duly authorized to sign and to 
ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention.
108 
 
Likewise, for all carriage to, from or within the EU, Regulation 889/2002 
provided for the implementation of the Montreal Convention in the EU. The entry into 
force of the Montreal Convention automatically rendered effective the Convention 
regime to all intra EU transportation, whether between member states or within member 
states (Article 2).
109  Consequently, Weber (2004) explains:  “The effect of Article 2 of 
the Regulation is compatible with the objective of a single aviation market within the EU, 
by providing operating conditions for competing air carrier ‘as if’ the EU was a domestic 
market.”
110 
 
While the EU’s acceptance of the Montreal Convention does not provide the 
Commission with a mandate to negotiate bilateral agreements with third countries on 
behalf of the member states, the Commission claims that it has the effect of increasing, at 
least  de facto, the Commission's competence to act on such issues.  Recently, the 
Commission has achieved rulemaking authority for the member states with the creation 
of the European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA).
111 The EU Joint Aviation Authorities 
(JAA) which had no direct regulatory authority was transformed into the EASA which 
now requires Member States to align with any EASA decisions, and to vote in unison on 
related issues before ICAO.
112 
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The Chicago Convention does not provide for any accession by regional 
organizations of states such as the European Community.
113  Furthermore, any 
amendment of the Convention to permit accession by the Community would require the 
consent of two-thirds of the convention’s Contracting States, a process which, 
considering earlier amendments, could take years to complete.  Although the European 
Commission formally requested a seat on the ICAO Council, it was opposed by Member 
States on the grounds that the seats on the Council currently held by Member States 
would thereby be reduced; on the other hand, third states opposed an additional seat 
increasing the total of European votes.  Therefore, the EC has since requested 
“permanent” observer status on ICAO’s Council.  Such status would allow participation 
without voting rights; it would also not require amendment of the Convention. 
 
In support of its request, the Commission argues that member states do not always 
speak with one voice in international transport organizations, which diminishes the 
Community's influence in the international air services sector.  The Commission also 
claims that a considerable body of law relating to air, and sea transport, has been adopted 
under the EC Treaty.  The community therefore argues that it should play a stronger role 
within the ICAO and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) respectively, in 
order to better meet its obligations with respect to its external competence; the objective 
is to guarantee consistency between Community and international law. 
 
The Commission also advances a legal justification for increased participation 
based on the AETR doctrine derived from the judgment of the European Court of Justice 
in 1971.  The Commission asserts that as the Community increasingly develops more 
common internal rules, it also acquires authority over external negotiations which might 
affect those common rules.  The Commission argues that if the Community has an 
internal competence to achieve a specific objective, it implicitly holds the exclusive 
competence on that subject as far as such an external exercise of competence is necessary 
to achieve that objective.
114 
 
It should, however, be noted that although general consensus in ICAO indicates 
that EU membership, and the necessary amendment of the Chicago Convention, would be 
a lengthy and painstaking process, “permanent” observer status on the ICAO Council 
appears to be the route that the EU and ICAO will undertake in the near future.  Such 
status will only require minor changes in Council rules and procedures, thus bypassing 
any amendment of the Chicago Convention.
115   
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A New Legal Order in Air Transport? 
 
Although the EU’s new policies have not yet been completely transformed into revised 
bilateral/plurilateral air service agreements with the United States and third countries, 
other “like-minded” countries around the globe are playing a pivotal role in the continued 
development of regional agreements.  The efforts of these countries along with the EU’s 
developments in air transport must be viewed as a catalyst for change.  In fact, the use of 
agreements between groups of “like-minded” economies, usually in the same region, is 
becoming more widely accepted, for example: 
 
•  Andean Open Skies Pact (1991)   
•  Yamoussokro II Ministerial Decision (1992) 
•  U.S. Canada “Open Skies” Agreement (1995) 
•  CARICOM Air Services Agreement (1996) 
•  Fortaleza Agreement (1997) 
•  Banjul Accord (1997) 
•  CLMV Agreement (1998) 
•  CEMAC (1999) 
•  COMESA (1999) 
•  MALIAT (2001) 
 
Despite legally binding commitments to “open skies” policies, the pace of 
liberalization actually adopted by each country has varied considerably because of the 
differences in economic situations and the status of airline privatization.  For example, in 
the Andean Pact, Columbia and Venezuela were willing to advance the liberalization 
process, yet Peru has sought to protect its airline from competition in the process to 
privatization.
116 
 
There are also moves to liberalize the air transport sector on an incremental basis.  
For example, moves to liberalize ownership and control are taking place on an ad hoc 
basis such as Australia’s acceptance of the right of establishment.  The Multilateral 
Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transport (MALIAT), which 
includes nine States in Asia, and North and South America, has sought to modify the 
standard ownership clause “with a view to providing new opportunities for investment in 
the airlines covered by the agreement.
117   
  
However, uneven development on a global basis only helps to perpetuate the 
more general unevenness of the world’s economic system.  For example, the rise of some 
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Asian economies has been matched by the tilt of the world's airline networks toward that 
region. The region's improved prosperity has also been reflected in the success of its 
airlines (e.g., Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific), the colossal cost of its new airports 
(e.g., Chek Lap Kok in Hong Kong and Kansai near Osaka), and the higher share of 
international traffic accounted for by increased Pacific Rim routes. Conversely, in other 
parts of the world, the air transport sector has languished along with the local economies 
that support it; some places are favored by their centrality in those networks and others 
are disadvantaged by their comparative isolation.
118 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The EU is currently playing a dynamic role in international air transport. It is forcing 
change not only in its relationships with its primary partners but potentially it is seeking 
to promote its own open skies policies upon the rest of the world in a manner which will 
prove to be even more revolutionary than the example of the United States. In many 
ways, regionalism in air transport service agreements is becoming the model for future 
development of what has been a matter of bilateral agreement since 1944. 
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